

DISCUSSION PAPER

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WAR AND PEACE IN ANGOLA

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INTRODUCTION

IMAGES OF WAR IN AFRICA

This paper begins with the songs Bob Marley entitled "War." This song articulated the longing for an end to colonial rule by Africans all over the world. In another song, "Ride natty ride," Marley wailed, "And everywhere the fire is burning, destroying and burning their soul. So ride natty ride, go de natty go de."¹ And now the people are gathered on the beach, the politicians rise to give a speech. The people said, 'sit down and pull your own weight'."

This song pointed to the resilience of the working people in the face of violence and spiritual degradation. Throughout the African continent and beyond, cultural artists and village dialecticians have taken the lead in providing inspiration for the resistance to the militarism and violence of external domination. Through songs, dance, and other forms of cultural reproduction, these forces have taken the lead in the mobilization for reconstruction and spiritual renewal. Angolan singers sing songs calling for reconciliation and peace. The issue which is posed is: Do we as African scholars and activists, pull our own weight in the search for peace in Angola?

How do we as scholars at the theoretical level challenge the dominant interpretations of war, conflicts and peace by showing how silenced narratives could provide alternative conceptualizations for understanding the real effects and consequences of war and peace which have been rationalized (in the social sciences literature especially in conflict resolution centers) as though certain peoples are naturally suited for war. What is the history of warfare and destabilization in Africa? In the period after the Cold War, there has arisen a plethora of institutions of conflict management whose mandate is to "manage chaos."²

In these institutions, which are to be found predominantly in Europe and North America, managing "chaos" is the new narrative for "managing ethnic conflict" since chaos is supposed to be a natural state to Africa and African "tribes" are in constant conflict with each other. There are many authorities who have categorized the war in Angola as a "civil war" but the concrete experience of warfare and violence is not only connected to the different political objectives of the combatants but also to the ideological system of colonialism and to the armaments culture of the West. One new component of this ideological system is the emphasis on humanitarian and political intervention in Africa.

Conflict resolution centers which are at the forefront of the discussion on peace can be distinguished from the historical peace research centers in Africa and in Europe which have campaigned for peace, even in the period of the cold war. The published works of centers such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the Africa Peace Research Institute (APRI) and the numerous UNESCO centers for disarmament and peace, had established a tradition of "education for peace" when the militarists from the countries producing weapons had glorified war and supported destabilization and violence in the name of anti-communism. In many instances, especially in the former centers of strategic studies, there are now research symposia and conferences on peace and justice, but these deliberations are carried out from the

relative safety of the societies which profit from war. From this safety, scholars can develop "Guidelines for Preserving Peace in Africa." ³ Seldom do these guidelines involve the building of democratic and participatory relations so that peace can be sustained and contradictions solved through internal deliberations.

The peace-keeping bona fides of many international organizations can now be evaluated in the year when Europeans are celebrating 50 years of peace and the defeat of fascism. Unfortunately, the triumphant celebrations of victory over fascism do not investigate the conditions in Europe which led to the capitalist depression, fascism and war. The United Nations (UN) was founded in 1945 after the carnage and genocide of the Second World War as a peace-keeping institution. It is now an opportune moment for Africans to re-examine the peace-keeping operations of the UN from the period of the decolonization of the Congo to the most recent peace-keeping forays in Angola, Rwanda and Somalia. There is a body of critical scholarship which has exposed the inability of the UN to develop clear goals for peace because of the competing interests of the permanent members of the Security Council. ⁴ There are many voices raising these concerns and the continued fighting in the Balkans has exposed the limits of the thinking behind the peace keepers of the Security Council in general. The principal question which has not been settled is whether peace can be guaranteed on the basis of trying to create territories and governments on the basis of ethnic identification?

In Africa, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has developed mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution and the Secretariat of the OAU is in the process of institutionalising these mechanisms. This decision of the OAU to develop its own mechanism represented an important departure from the founding tenet of the organization where a key axiom "non interference in internal affairs" was the most important element of African cohesion and cooperation for the leaders. ⁵ This departure emerged in the context of growing wars on the continent. Under it, the Secretary General of the OAU was empowered to mobilise resources to prevent conflict, but as so far, the resources for effective conflict prevention are still being sought from external sources. The experience of regional attempts to intervene for peace have not been totally successful in Rwanda and Liberia. Regional cooperation in the context of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to resolve conflicts have been more positive as in the cases of Mozambique and Lesotho in 1994. The same cooperation which was evident in the activities of the Frontline states in fighting against Apartheid is now being harnessed in the context of the Association for Southern African States (ASAS). In Southern Africa there is greater cooperation in light of the historic linkages in the sub-region.

The experience of the peoples of Southern Africa has been that of wars ever since the period of European domination and colonization. European pacification campaigns met with military resistance on the part of the African poor. White settler dictatorship ensured that all aspects of social relations were governed by relations of force. Force was used to alienate land and to remove African peasants from their communities so that they could become cheap and bonded labourers. In the period immediately after the Second World War, Africans had to resort to arms to gain the elementary demand of political independence. These wars could be called "just" in so far as international law has justified the rights of oppressed peoples to be free from foreign domination.

The war for liberation in Southern Africa was protracted because the stakes were so high for the forces in combat, with the African poor on one side of the battle field and

White settlers in alliance with international mining monopolies on the other side. Once the mineral resources of the region had been designated as strategic for the West, the arsenal of the military industrial complex was brought to bear to support very conservative settler leaders. A fascist government in Portugal was able to mobilise the support of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in trying to halt the decolonization process in the former Portuguese territories of Angola, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde and Sao Tome. Angola as a mineral rich country was seen as a significant prize and the continued warfare in that society had its origins in the deformed nature of Portuguese colonial rule. This deformity was compounded by the alliance with the South African racists.

The full importance of the role of the apartheid government in this war became clearer in the eighties when Angola was engulfed in the general war of destabilization in the region of Southern Africa. Many aspects of this destabilization have been documented and some authorities have attempted to quantify the cost of the warfare. Angola is a country of over 11 million citizens and at the time of writing there are over 3.9 million persons displaced by the war. In the short period 1992 to 1994, more than 100,000 persons lost their lives. The cost of the destruction has been measured by the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs at over US\$20 billion. Yet, as Jacques Depelchin had warned, the efforts by peace lobbyists to measure the cost of destabilization had the unintended effect of trivializing the effects of war and destruction. The destruction of human life is the most profound aspect of the war in Angola.

The question which is posed by Depelchin is how do those who really long for peace but reap war conceptualize such destructive experiences when the most accessible modes of expression and communication are imposed by the very forces which are directly or indirectly responsible for such a situation? The evidence of continuous warfare in Angola forces progressive scholars to reconsider the dominant concepts of peace-keeping and peace-making when there are vested interests inside and outside of Angola who profit from continuous warfare. From the period of the Alvor agreement in 1975 to the Lusaka Accords of 1994, there have been efforts to lay the ground rules for peace in Angola. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of the Cuban forces, peace remained elusive because of the heavy investment in warfare. Angola was one of the few countries in Africa with the resources to finance the purchase of conventional weapons.

The peace accord signed by the government of Angola with South Africa and Cuba in 1988 brought the withdrawal of South African troops from Angola in 1989. This accord laid the basis for the implementation of UN Resolution 435, the withdrawal of South African forces from Angola and Namibia, leading to the independence of Namibia. This accord did not end the involvement of South Africa in the Angolan war. There were intensified battles between 1989 and 1991 when the Bicesse Accords were signed to bring peace to Angola. This agreement was conceptualized in the simple terms of a ceasefire, the confinement of troops to assembly areas, demobilization of the Popular Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) the army of the MPLA, and the Armed Forces For the Liberation of Angola (FALA), the army of UNITA, and the creation of a new army, The Angolan Armed forces (FAA), the collection and disposal of weapons and the organization of elections in 1992.⁶

The monitoring system for the peace accords comprised of soldiers from the Joint Political-Military Commission. This was a Commission of primarily military men who

had a history of solving political questions by violence. Angolans who were not involved in war were not incorporated in the main monitoring of the peace process. Similarly, non-military parties and institutions were not involved on the Joint Verification and Monitoring Commission (CMVF) which was responsible for the implementation and functioning of the mechanisms instituted to verify and exercise control over the ceasefire. Even though both the armies of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) and National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) claimed to have women in their ranks, there were no women supervising the ceasefire, nor ensuring the effective observance of the cease fire. Though the UN Special Representative overseeing the peace process was a woman, her stewardship was more in the Thatcherite tradition than in that of a feminist who wanted peace. The agenda for the Lusaka Protocol of 1994 maintained the same militarist approach to the question of peace. The flaws of the past attempts at peace have been highlighted by many authorities who have blamed the UN for "making peace on the cheap." No less a person than Margaret Anstee, the Special Representative of the Secretary General during the period of the implementation of the Bicesse Accords, has criticised the foundations of the 1992 peace-keeping mission in Angola.⁷ Moral arguments on the causes of the "civil war" and the violations on the laws of war since 1992 obscure the fact that warfare is a specific form of physical coercion. Mary Kaldor in her analysis of "warfare and capitalism" has provided an insight into the kind of social relations which generate wars of the kind which gutted the Angolan society. "Under capitalism, warfare has become an aspect of state activity. This is even more true of civil wars where the insurgent forces are generally organized as a form of proto state. Any attempt to analyze the role of warfare has to deal with the role of the state."⁸

The stress on the role of the state brings to the fore the social relations and class forces inside and outside Angola with a vested interest in either war or peace. It was Von Clausewitz who characterized war as "the continuation of politics by other means." In Angola this interconnection between war and politics has been most explicit especially in the context of the alliance between UNITA and South Africa. The lessons of the previous efforts at peace-making require a theoretical approach to the issues of war and peace which elevates the discussion beyond the technical issues of the UN peace-keeping mandate in Angola. There is also the requirement of clarifying the role of ethnicity and ethnic identification in the politics of war. The destruction of the Ovimbundu heartland of Cuito and Huambo by UNITA should have exposed the myth that the war in Angola was predicated on ethnic loyalties but the dominant narrative on "tribal wars" in Africa ensures that in some centers the war in Angola is characterised as ethnic violence. The corollary of this is that peace will be based on ethnic balancing and power sharing.

Amilcar Cabral had warned in Guinea that although ethnicity constituted an important factor for the people, divisions of class, religion and gender are also important. In Angola, though there has been a lot written on the ethnic nature of the social forces, less has been recorded in relation to race and class. Far less has been recorded in relation to gender. So far the gendered nature of warfare and violence has in the main eluded scholars and commentators on the war. This is a crucial area of investigation since this kind of analysis shifts the discussion to the social relations of power between men and women at all levels of social reproduction. A gendered analysis of war and peace would explore the construction of social relations at all levels: the homestead, the village community, the school, institutions of spiritual reflection, the government, the armed

forces and in economic relations. Such an analysis would focus on how men are socialised to be warriors and are portrayed as valiant while women are portrayed as weak and vulnerable. In war, the development of arms and weaponry and their use has been central to the modern concept of the male experience.⁹

Angolan men and women have suffered from war and the politicization of ethnicity. However, Angolan african women have suffered the full effects of the war and the dislocations in the countryside. They were the most ardent supporters of the peace process and the electoral process in 1992.¹⁰ Warfare and violence at the level of the state has contributed to the general climate where social issues are dealt with in a violent manner. Hence, at the domestic level violence has been evident. This gave rise to a special non-governmental organization in Luanda defending the rights of battered women. For this paper therefore, the gendered nature of war becomes a far more important issue than ethnicity.

Because the question of the relationship between gender and politics has been underdeveloped in the context of nationalist politics, the discussion on gender is raising new elements in African politics. This process of developing a new political culture is slow growing out of the ashes of colonial forms and the inheritance bequeathed to the African politicians. The issues of war and peace in Angola are linked to the decisive issue of the mode of politics. Will the process depart from the commandism and force of the colonial inheritance or would more democratic forms of governance be developed? Would the political process depart from the mode of vanguardism to neo liberalism? It is the contention of this paper that the question of peace in Angola is tied to the decisive issue of the development of emancipatory politics, which requires the reorganization of the popular participation and expression. In the short run, this reorganization is being predicated on the restructuring of the forms of economic intervention for economic liberalization and multi partyism. The long term alternative is for the redistribution of the wealth of the society to meet the needs of the vast majority of the producers whose lives have been negatively affected by war. This alternative is one component of the ideological war of the choices in Africa.

War speeds up the processes of transformation and/or regression. In the past 20 years warfare and violence were registered as negative forms of coercion in a former colonial society. The evidence of the political war along with the economic changes since Angola joined the IMF has been for the government to implement an economic and social programme which aims at opening up the economy to "market forces." This economic programme is similar in content to the program presented by UNITA in its election manifesto in 1992. The party form of vanguardism of the MPLA had given way to the acceptance of the same principles of economic liberalization as the World Bank. For the World Bank, the principal issues in the society relate to trade, price and wage reform. The 1992 elections were the opening rounds of the battle to develop a parliamentary mode of politics which is based on elite forms of political intervention.¹¹

The IMF and the World Bank have been supporting privatization of nationalised sectors of the economy as the answer to inefficiency and loss-making enterprises, but this economic path has been problematic since Africans in Angola did not have the economic resources to give meaning to the pressure to privatise the economy. Those who initiated the economic reforms in Angola were faced with the reality that the social forces with the requisite capital to fully benefit from a policy of privatization were the uprooted elements of settler colonialism who had retreated to South Africa and Portugal after

independence. In the absence of an African capitalist class, most of the property in Angola had been nationalized in 1975. The Marxist history of the MPLA and its links to countries such as Cuba continue to be one of the issues in the see-saw between war and peace.

This question of the content of peace and reconstruction is a problem not only for Angola but also for the region of Southern Africa. In this sense the history of colonialism and apartheid confronts the producers who had been brutally exploited and discriminated against while the wealth of their societies was plundered. Africans who produce the wealth in Southern Africa want this wealth to be used to provide for the basic requirements of social reproduction, food, clothing, shelter, relevant education and affordable health care. The elementary social gains for health education and housing which had been conceded in the decolonization process are now being eroded under the impact of structural adjustment programmes.

The reversal of these gains in societies such as Mozambique has led to the view that the struggle in Southern Africa is simultaneously a struggle against colonialism and recolonization. It has become clear in Angola that the issue of peace is tied to the resolution of the question of which elements will be in the central administration of the bureaucracy when the capital-intensive war of the past 20 years comes to an end. The articulation of the issue of peace then becomes a class and racial issue and in this sense it is imperative that African scholars develop a clear understanding of the real content of peace.

During the period of the Cold War, the USSR supported an International Peace Council in its ideological war with the USA. The United States, which has emerged as the foremost arms exporter, now supports numerous institutions to promote peace. Some of these institutions have genuine peace workers but there are scholars in the military establishment who view peace-making as an aspect of low-intensity warfare.¹² It is the interconnection between low-intensity warfare and peace-making which has made many Third World countries cautious with respect to the peace-keeping credentials of the USA in the UN. Yet, given the present construction of international politics, it is to the agencies of the United Nations dedicated to peace that one seeks to get a coherent understanding of intervention for peace. Progressive Africans may criticize the agencies of the United Nations but the nature of the critique has to be distinguished from that of conservative forces in North America.

There has been considerable debate and discussion within the UN agencies as to the real content of peace. One author defined peace as follows:

By peace we mean the absence of violence in any given society, both internal and external, direct and indirect. We further mean the non-violent results of the equality of rights, by which every member of the society, through non-violent means, participates equally in decisional power which regulates it, and the distribution of resources which sustain it.¹³

Nearly every year since the United Nations designated 1986 as The International Year of Peace, UNESCO has been mounting conferences to refine the concept of peace. UNESCO took the lead from the General Assembly of the UN, declaring that "every nation and every human being, regardless of race, conscience, language or sex has the inherent right to life in peace."

In 1982 UNESCO adopted this posture with respect to peace:

There can be no genuine peace when the most elementary human rights are violated or while situations of injustice continue to exist, conversely, human rights for all cannot take root and achieve full growth while latent or open conflicts are rife...

Peace is incompatible with malnutrition, extreme poverty and the refusal of the rights of self determination. Disregard for the rights of individuals, the persistence of inequitable international economic structures, interference in the internal affairs of other states, foreign occupation and apartheid are always real or potential sources of armed conflict and international crisis. The only lasting peace is a just peace based on respect for human rights. Furthermore, a just peace calls for the establishment of an equitable international order which will preserve future generations from the scourge of war.

This concept of peace is most relevant to this analysis since this concept is not only concerned with the silencing of weapons and ceasefire. It also implies that Africans cannot speak of peace without fundamental changes in the international system with respect to disarmament and demilitarization.¹⁴ Though the contribution of this analytical framework is significant, there is not enough work done on the relationship between the history of the society and the social forces who seek peace. This process is what Depelchin terms "conceptualizing and contextualizing the dialectical relationship between war and peace." He argued that "societies which have gone through the devastation of wars cultivate different histories. These histories are nurtured by memories and silences."¹⁵ One of the most deafening silences in Angola is that of the origins of the struggle for self-determination and the alliances of the parties. Though this struggle is embedded in the memory of the people, the thrust of external forces is to erase this memory.

It is the contention of this paper that the war and negotiations over peace are actual mirrors of a larger war and negotiating process. In the short run, the political weakness of the governing elements in Angola will dictate that the content of the negotiations will benefit the very same forces who profited from the war. This can be gleaned from the appeals of the Department of Humanitarian Affairs of the United Nations. The three main elements of this appeal consist of (i) work with respect to relief, resettlement and repatriation activities, (ii) activities to clear the more than ten million landmines in the country-side and, (iii) support for the demobilization of former combatants and their reintegration into civilian life. The principal agencies and organizations which are targeted as social agents are the very same organizations which prompted Joseph Hanlon to raise the question of Mozambique: Who Calls the Shots?

This paper begins with an analysis of the writings on the war and highlights the essence of disinformation in much of this writing. Some of it could be called propaganda supporting combatants in the war. The importance of this "intellectual propaganda" is that it forms an important part of the historical record on war in Angola. The underdevelopment of the intellectual culture of Portuguese colonialism and its legacies meant that there is considerable literature in English. The underdevelopment is also related to the social structure of the society and the weakness of the middle strata. This contribution seeks to develop the theoretical tools of Amilcar Cabral with respect to the social structure. The insights of Wamba Dia Wamba are also brought to bear to seek a better understanding of the war than the conflict resolution theories.

The Angolan war witnessed a conjunction of action by a broad spectrum of forces inside and outside the continent of Africa. The wars in Angola had a decisive impact on the

whole of Southern Africa and this has already been examined in the context of the importance of the victory of the Angolans over the South African armed forces at Cuito Cuanavale.¹⁶ This analysis of the social structure underlines the weakness of an African capitalist class and the stakes which are involved in the war.

Despite the absence of a local accumulating class, the wealth of Angola dictated the prolongation of a capital intensive war which was fuelled by the mineral resources of Angola. An examination of the interconnections between extraction of wealth and war can be seen from the fact that the petroleum sector was relatively unaffected by the war despite the seizure of Soyo by UNITA in 1993. The seizure of Soyo and the occupation of towns and cities by UNITA exposed the fact that the war was a conventional one. This fact also underlined the contradictions between the rhetoric of African fundamentalism of UNITA and their dependence on external sources of military capital. For a brief period, though the MPLA was also plagued by this dependence, the fact that a small socialist state such as Cuba had mobilized the non-aligned and progressive forces to defend Angola against apartheid had neutralized the corrosive effects of the dependence on foreign military advisors.

The fact that the MPLA had to resort to the use of the same elements like lobbyists and South African military consultants such as Executive Outcomes that historically had supported UNITA demonstrated the weaknesses of the MPLA and the intense effort to make this party another comprador instrument for the recolonization of Africa.

PROPAGANDA AND WARFARE

John Mackenzie in his Book, Propaganda and Empire: the Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880 -1960 outlined how the various vehicles for imperial propaganda, the theatre, the cinema, radio, literature and school textbooks, were mobilised to support the military and economic policies of the British ruling class in the hey-day of colonialism. The importance of this study lay in the fact that though overt British colonialism is no more a reality (except for a few islands in the Caribbean and in Ireland), the alliance of the Anglo-American media along with the accompanying intellectual infrastructure dictates that the ideological cluster which influenced this propaganda onslaught is still at work, especially with respect to Africa and Africans. The advent of television and films expanded the cultural processes for manipulating public opinion. Mackenzie linked the relationship between advertising and other marketing techniques in the effort to make imperial propaganda profitable.

During World War II the propaganda of the British was simultaneously anti-fascist and anti- communist. An effective presentation of the success of the individual and the role of the market was refined along with those ideas of Social Darwinism which justified the domination of colonial societies by European countries. For a brief period, the crude civilizing mission of the imperial enterprise was replaced by the modernising role of Europe and America. Mackenzie outlined how much of the intellectual activity, especially with respect to justifying imperialism in school textbooks was overtly propagandist. He defined propaganda as "the transmission of ideas and values from one person, or group of persons, with the specific intention of influencing the recipients' attitudes in such a way that the interests of its authors will be enhanced."¹⁷ Western propaganda has been at work at all phases of the decolonization process in Africa.

By the end of the Cold War, the development of psychological warfare and disinformation had become so entrenched that the citizens of the advanced capitalist countries came to believe their own propaganda with respect to the realities of the anti-colonial struggle. The creation of a terrorism industry in the Cold War was linked to the security industry and African Freedom fighters were routinely called terrorists.¹⁸ Every African liberation organization from the FLN in Algeria to the ANC in South Africa suffered from this disinformation campaign. The fact that the Angolan war of liberation was catapulted into the centre of the Cold War divide meant that the arsenal of this disinformation and propaganda was brought to bear in Angola. Hence, during the period of the Angolan independence struggle, the MPLA were pawns of the Soviet Union and their "surrogate" Cuba and SWAPO of Namibia was a terrorist organization. Jonas Savimbi was a freedom fighter feted at the White House and the South Africans were fighting "communist subversion in Africa."

This conclusion is reinforced by the extensive bibliography on Angola: the Struggle for Power, The Political, Social and economic Context 1980 -1993, compiled by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA) in Johannesburg, South Africa. As an intellectual organ of the South African state, the SAIIA had always presented itself as a liberal force, but this organization was at all times Eurocentric and anti-communist. The authors like most supremacists could not present the facts of the defeat of the SADF in Angola. The authors of this bibliography started with the date of 1980 since this was the beginning of the massive destabilization which was given a positive gloss and called "constructive engagement." It was the period of linkage imposed by the Reagan Administration in the United States.

This collection of over 600 pages exposed the interests of the apartheid military establishment in the justification for their extended war in Angola, 1975-1994. Presented in a neutral academic manner, this extensive bibliography is a very sophisticated presentation of the themes of the South Africans that they were supporting freedom fighters who were opposed to communist incursion in Southern Africa. This bibliography follows a stream of publications published by a so-called Ashanti Publishers on the war in Angola. Two of the main authors publishing under this publishing house are well known hagiographers, one being none other than Bridgland who had written the celebratory book, Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. This same author presented a book under Ashanti publishers The War for Africa which argued that South Africa withdrew from Cuito Cuanavale in order to support the diplomatic initiatives of Chester Crocker. This theme of the strategic retreat of the South Africans at Cuito Cuanavale was also the thrust of the book by Helmoed - Romer Heitman, War in Angola: The Final South African Stage, Ashanti Publishers, Gibraltar, 1990.¹⁹ None of these books from the South African sources brought out the fact that there were young White conscripts who were suffering from post-stress traumatic disorder (pstd).

This body of literature is part of a new genre of intellectual work which seeks to delegitimise the liberation struggles in Africa. Geo-politics, systems analysis, ethnic rivalry and anti-communism which is founded on the conceptual poverty of the West when confronted with the politics of self-determination hindered the authors of this bibliography from grasping the dynamism behind the decolonization of Namibia. It was this same dynamism which prevented the military claims of the SADF from gaining support from the African majority in South Africa. There is very little literature on the Angolan process which saw the activities of the Angolan government as legitimate. In the most recent battles, the activities of the government have sought to transform the

history of national liberation. The link between the Angolan government and the South African company Executive Outcomes was the clearest expression of this regression. Executive Outcomes is a private consultancy firm with soldiers for hire. This private army is comprised of the former special forces of the South African Defence Forces (SADF).

Though there have been attempts by Africans such as Amílcar Cabral to develop a theory of liberation, the dominant literature has been from those sources which distorted the basis of the struggle. This is evident from the influential two volume study on Angola by John Marcum. Marcum's central thesis is that the actions of the three parties (the FLNA, MPLA and UNITA), the political differences between them, their politico-diplomatic ties etc, were a result of strong ethnic consciousness. This analysis fed into the dominant ethnic themes of the military Journals of Paratus (the SADF journal) and themes of the organic intellectuals of the South African state apparatus.²⁰

The Angolan government could not mobilise the kind of resources which were available to the South Africans in their anti- communist crusade. The government radio was not as effective as that of UNITA since the facility of the political leadership in the area of African languages was limited. The President could only speak in Portuguese and the television audience was restricted to the urban Portuguese-speaking population with electricity. The written sources on the Angolan war which presented the views of the government are in the main in Portuguese and limited to sympathizers of the MPLA. The three main sources with a perspective critical of South African and Western propaganda on the war are, Basil Davidson, In the Eye of the Storm, Anchor Books, 1973; William Minter, Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique, Zed Books, London, 1994; Michael Wolfers and Jane Bergerol, Angola in the Frontline, Zed Books, London 1983; and Keith Sommerville, Angola, Politics, Economics and Society, Pinter Publishers, London. One of the main weaknesses of this body of literature is the inability to critically analyze the limitations of the state Marxism of the MPLA, hence there is no clear understanding of the dramatic shift in the economic policies of the MPLA since 1991.

SOURCES WITH SYMPATHIES FOR UNITA

An examination of the literature on the war with overt support for UNITA revealed clearly the linkages between warfare and propaganda. In the 1980s Bridgland wrote of the exploits of UNITA centralising the "charisma" of Jonas Savimbi and suggested that this leader was a key to Africa. The fact that the print media was not so well established in Africa led to the sharpening of the tools of the radio and television for the propaganda war in Angola. The radio station, "Voice of the Resistance of the Black Cockerel," beamed across Central and Southern Africa, continuing, in the words of one commentator, "to pour out disinformation and to stir ethnic hatred, poisoning the country's future."²¹ This radio station, though crude and manipulative of ethnic identity, was supported by the USA, especially the Central Intelligence Agency. The International Freedom Foundation which launched the Democratic International at Jamba in 1988 mobilised support from conservative forces to provide resources for a coordinated propaganda effort. This same organization orchestrated a Hollywood film, Red Scorpion, celebrating the hagiographic details presented in the book by Bridgland. Those in the media who were closely connected to UNITA dubbed Jonas Savimbi,

"Reagan's African Rambo."

The importance of this cluster of books, film and radio lay in the way in which these ideas were supported by policy-makers in the United States. The evidence of the relationships between war, disinformation and propaganda is most evident in the scholarship of the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Chester Crocker. Throughout his career as the chief policy maker for Africa in the Reagan administration (1981-1988), Dr. Crocker had access to the resources of US information technology and agencies to promote the interests of destabilization (disguised as constructive engagement). Since his retreat to academia he has published his version of the confrontation in Southern Africa. The very title of the book, High Noon in Southern Africa: Keeping Peace in a Rough Neighbourhood, distorted the historical evidence of the destabilization and destruction in Southern Africa. The author of the book, who was himself the originator of the theory of "constructive engagement," claimed credit for peace, when it was the very concept of linkage which orchestrated the repeal of the Clark amendment and provided military and financial support for UNITA and South Africa in order to remove "the communists" from power in Angola.

The anti-communist theme which is the main thrust of this propaganda is repeated in a number of important books. Four of the most strident are listed in this discussion on propaganda and warfare: (a) Leon Dash Jr., Savimbi's 1977 Campaign Against the Cubans and the MPLA; Munger Africana Notes, City 1977; (b) W. Martin James, A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, Transaction Publishers, New Jersey, 1992; (c) Daniel Spikes, Angola and the Politics of Intervention, Mcfarland Books, City 1993; and (d) A. Klinghoffer, The Angolan War: a Study in Soviet Policy in the Third World, Westview Press, Boulder, Col, 1980. These books written for audiences outside of Africa justified the military support which went to UNITA from the Republican establishment in the USA.

Elaine Windrich in her book The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi, the US Media and the Angolan War, Greenwood Press, New York, 1992, provided an antidote to the crude anticommunism of the propaganda organized by the International Freedom Foundation. The importance of the book lay in the massive documentation which brought out forces in the US media which ensured that there was positive information on UNITA so that there would be "effective and appropriate support from the US Congress for the war." The chapter on "War Propaganda: Hot and Cold" brought out the extensive cover-up of the role of the South African defence forces in the destruction of the infrastructure in the country. Instead, the economic crisis in the country was blamed on the communist policies of the MPLA. It was this same hot and cold propaganda which presented media and television positions on the magnanimity of UNITA in winning the peace, in the signing of the Bicesse Accords. European television stations carried special reports on the bravery of UNITA after the visit of Jonas Savimbi to the European Parliament in 1991. Reality soon intervened and the real democratic and peace-making credentials of UNITA were revealed after the 1992 elections.

There are a few books which have been critical of the US policies in Angola. One of the more outstanding has been that by John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, Norton, City 1978. The importance of this book lay in the fact that the author was the head of the CIA task force for Angola when Kissinger wanted to halt the coming to power of the MPLA in 1975. In many respects, the book, Angola: the Politics of Intervention reads as an attempt to discredit the information in Stockwell's book.

The imperatives of the war has produced critical commentaries on the levels of destruction in Angola. Much of this writing on the number of amputees or the amount of displaced persons comes from international NGO sources. This is evident from the most recent publication by Human Rights Watch on Angola: Arms Trade and Violations of the Laws of War Since the 1992 Elections. The major limitation of this book is that it seeks to lay the blame for the outbreak of the war in 1992 on both sides. In many ways, this book could be seen as far more sophisticated propaganda than the work of Crocker.²² Presenting an in depth account of the military organization, structure and operations of the government's army and that of UNITA, this monograph traces the methods of arms procurement and how UNITA was able to obtain weapons despite the sanctions of the United Nations. There is a clear analysis of the impact of city sieges and the indiscriminate bombing and shelling of civilian areas "by both sides." This line of reasoning followed the position of the United Nations in its publication of The United Nations and the Situation in Angola, May 1991-June 1994. In this monograph the UN failed to take responsibility for the breakdown of the peace process and the bloodletting of November 1, 1992 which precipitated the most recent stage of the war. One writer has argued that "Indeed, dozens of articles, television and radio documentaries, in many languages often made after clandestine visits to Huambo from Zaire and South Africa have served to alter the image of the events of that weekend in Luanda and Lubango out of all recognition."²³

BOOKS ON PEACE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

There have been two full length books on the peace process in Angola. One prepared by the Cuban government. The Peace Process of Cuito Cuanavale, presented the Cuban version of the negotiating process before and after the defeat of the South Africans in Angola.²⁴ The intellectual content of the other book was driven by the consultancy syndrome of some non- governmental actors in Southern Africa. In this context see Sustainable Peace Angola's Recovery, compiled by David Sogge, Southern African Research and Documentation Centre, Harare, 1992. The main critique of this kind of writing was its ahistorical approach with respect to the social forces involved in the war and consequently the social forces most interested in peace. The remarkable aspect of the key incidents of the Angolan war is how the massive information campaign organized by the West to support UNITA has been able to maintain support mechanisms for warfare in order to support the destabilization of Angola. This destabilization was founded not only on military intervention, since the broad spectrum of appeals for aid played a part in presenting the Angolan peoples as helpless victims crippled by war. Elaine Windrich in her study also pointed out how famine was used as propaganda in warfare. There have been many instances in the war where in collaboration with US agencies, UNITA was able to get international recognition for the right to receive and distribute famine relief through its own military and administrative structures.²⁵

There is now a growing body of literature in Africa which is pointing out that "humanitarian intervention" is a form of coercive diplomacy to undermine the sovereignty of African societies. Many African scholars have pointed out that humanitarian interventions are seldom the last resorts they claim to be. "Intervening parties, in fact, have often been complicity in creating the humanitarian emergencies which intervention is now supposedly to remedy."²⁶ This conclusion made in the case of

Somalia,, becomes pertinent in the context of Angola in the face of the massive humanitarian appeals made by the UN to "assist in relief assistance and the promotion of human welfare." On the one hand, the IMF and the World Bank discourage the expenditure of the government on education, health and social needs while the Humanitarian Assistance Unit of the Department of Humanitarian affairs coordinates the provision of these services with international agencies and NGOs.²⁷

The presentation of the people of Angola as helpless "victims " in a never ending "civil war "is part of a narrative which devalues the historical resistance of the Angolan peoples from the period of Queen Nzinga to the battles at Cuito Cuanavale. Cuito Cuanavale was a turning point in the history of Southern Africa and in the next section we analyze the social forces of Angola in relationship to war.

Cabral in his study of the social structure of colonial Guinea had underscored the classes which had a vested interest in national liberation. National liberation was a special kind of war in the sense that the political objectives of the national liberation project were very clear: the recovery of political independence. Amilcar Cabral, in the book Revolution in Guinea, had outlined class forces in the society in order to develop a clear military strategy for the PAIGC. This strategy was meant to clarify those elements which supported liberation and those forces which collaborated with Portuguese colonialism. This analysis of the social structure becomes important in pointing out how the initiative for war shifted from the imperatives of decolonization to the consolidation of class forces inside and outside of Angola.

In that analysis, Cabral presented the working poor as the principal force in the search for emancipation. In the specific case of Angola, there is a paucity of literature on the class composition of the society. The ethnographic studies of the Portuguese tended to gloss over embryonic class differences in the rural areas. W. G. Clarence-Smith in his study of the society outlined how "racial and ethnic antagonisms sprang largely from the economic insecurity of petty bourgeois elements in the colonial society, who were constantly threatened with proletarianization and struggling to break out of the vicious circle of debt. Racial and ethnic factors were used by sectors of the petty bourgeois to increase their own security at the expense of others."²⁸

Though the analysis of Clarence-Smith was based on the period prior to 1945, the importance of this historical evidence is to place in a context the vacillation of the middle strata of Angolan society. The fact is that one has to penetrate the social structure to be able to understand how Angolans could have put other Angolans through the kind of suffering which was witnessed in the bombing and shelling of cities. The literature on the war was an expression of the external allies of local forces. Documentation on the attitude of the workers and peasants to the war has to be found in songs, dance and oral rendition of the various battles.

THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WAR.

Wamba Dia Wamba in a very little known essay, "Some Aspects of the Historical Background to National Liberation Struggles in Southern Africa: The Case of Angola," drew attention to the underdevelopment of Portugal and how this retardation of the colonisers affected the political autonomy of the Angolan working class. In this essay, Wamba pointed out how ideological and political intolerance by certain class forces had

led to political repression and hindered creative political thinking.

It took a long time and struggle for the assimilated Angolans' anti-colonial movement to link up with the large mass resistance movement of the Angolan masses of people. The centrality of the military aspect in the liberation struggle has had a considerable impact on the commandist character of the political leadership and the difficulty of developing a politically autonomous civil society. This tendency partially explains the temptation of a military solution to the national question in Angola.

Wamba started out from an explicit position of supporting the liberation project, but did not limit the articulation of this project to the ideas of those with power. He underlined the historical conditions of forced labour and the coercive relations of colonialism which served to mobilise the working poor against colonial rule. In this analysis, he developed a chart of the differing class interests²⁹

In all wars there are combatants and competing ideas. The principal ideas in the war in Angola are those of domination and African liberation. The ideas of domination presented by the scholars pulling their weight for colonial and neo-colonial domination have sought to blur the search for emancipation by using the ethnic narrative. At the level of intellectual production, the ideas for liberation retreated into the memory of the workers and peasants. In the words of Cabral, like seeds waiting for the right conditions for germination. The conditions for germination have suffered a tremendous setback with the dispersal and disorganization of the communities in Angola: This has been most evident in the countryside. In 1995, the population of Angola was estimated over 11.2 million. The study of Clarence-Smith on the peasantry in the pre-WW II period pointed to the high level of differentiation among the peasantry, ranging from the pastoralists in the South to the coffee producers in the Northern areas. The relative under-populated nature of this country is a striking factor.

Social differentiation among the peasantry had been rapid since WW II. The chiefs who were allied to colonial rule were the first to get access to the limited colonial education provided by missionaries. The leadership of both FLNA and UNITA arose out of the rising class of rich African farmers in the rural areas. Warfare had led to a systematic displacement of the peasantry since the Portuguese attempted to establish protected villages and this displacement was compounded by South African occupation and the 10 million mines planted in the rural areas. The trauma caused by landmines increased the dispersal of the poor peasants from the rural areas. Landmines made no distinction between combatants and ordinary citizens. Even though the military benefits of the landmines were negligible, their destructive effects on the peasantry will last for a long period after the war.

The peasantry have been uprooted as a result of 30 years of war: (a) the villagization project of the Portuguese, (b) peasants fleeing the areas of South African occupation, and (c) the peasantry fleeing the massive firepower of a two capital-intensive armies in a poor country. This dispersal has created a very large population of d'eclasse' elements in Angolan society. The other distinction in the peasantry has to do with the gender relations in the rural areas. War shifted the burden of social reproduction on to the shoulders of the women. On the one hand the traditional women's role of nurturing and protecting was not only sustained but extended by the conditions of war. During the period of national liberation, the peasant women formed the backbone of the resistance. Through songs, dance, music and the retention of spiritual values they maintained the spirit of independence under colonial rule. During the period of colonial rule the

divisions among the peasantry were not so pronounced, but these divisions were manipulated by the competing political parties in the immediate period before independence. This competition created room for future exploitation of the subjective element of African consciousness among the African people. This became clear in the propaganda of African fundamentalism which was beamed by the Voice of the Black Cockerel.

The repression of the rural political economy can be measured by the present continuous appeals for food for those in the rural areas. In the villages, the peasants suffered regardless of which side they supported. Class differentiation in the rural areas and the simplistic definition of the peasantry presented by the MPLA during the period of the class analysis "created a social base for the opposition to the government". Impoverishment of the peasantry led at best to apathy and at worst overt hostility to the government in Luanda.³⁰

The declared Maoist strategy of UNITA to control the countryside meant that the bulk of the war was fought in the rural areas and that women in the rural areas felt the full force of the war from both sides. The breakdown of the peasant sector created food shortages and dumped millions of poor peasants in the urban "musseques". The poor Angolan peasants had no immunity to violence and they will continue to suffer the consequences of the mining of the country-side, long after the politicians decide on the future forms of political competition.

If peasants suffered, peasant women suffered even more. They were highly vulnerable to violence, whether military, social or domestic and in the case of UNITA could be called upon to be the carriers of weapons. The women in the areas controlled by UNITA were especially exploited since the ideas of military communism of UNITA precluded any form of independent thinking. Moreover, in the name of "preserving African traditions" African women were called upon to support their own domination. Sexual abuse and violence was the norm in the military camps where women, especially the younger ones, had no control over their bodies or their lives. The reproductive roles of women were seen as an extension of the war effort since women produced the human labour necessary for UNITA for the reproduction of new soldiers who were taken from their parents at the age of six. Women did the bulk of the portering for the FALA army. The war affected women in the rural areas in the most devastating manner. They bore the brunt of the hardships imposed by the indiscriminate laying of mines.

The effects of militarism affected women in the areas of MPLA control, though not in the same manner since the government tried to effect a new family code to protect the rights of women. Though the government enacted a progressive family code in 1990, the changes in the legal statutes in relation to the oppression of women in the rural areas did not change the deeply ingrained social practices associated with patriarchy. The constitutional guarantees of equal rights could not be enacted in the period of warfare and dislocation.

While the MPLA gestured toward equality in the law, UNITA invoked African culture to justify the subjugation of women. UNITA used starvation as a strategy of war and this affected women and children throughout the society. One publication stated that, "UNITA has consistently used starvation as a method of combat, in violation of the rules of war. UNITA justifies this by claiming that the majority of the population in the besieged towns and cities are linked to the military." UNITA made rural Angolans captives in areas that it controlled by refusing the people unhindered safe passage to

their chosen destination. One effect of this war was to dramatically increase the size of the working class both employed and unemployed.

THE WORKING CLASS AND THE URBANIZATION OF ANGOLA

The politics of space and race under colonialism provided one of the clearest issues of contention in Angolan society. It was the organization of the labour process and the incessant exploitation to which the working poor were subjected which gave rise to the awakening of the consciousness of Angolans. The stone towns and the mud towns were microcosms of the differences based on class and race. Urbanization, war and class formation is an area where more research is necessary. In the post World War II era, the working class was concentrated in the mining, plantation, small factories and oil-refining sections of the society. The Benguela Railroad and the transport sector had led to a high level of mobility of workers hence speeding integration among the working class. In cities such as Lobito and Benguela, there was a very skilled and educated section of workers. The dock workers also exhibited a high level of political consciousness. They were exposed to international commerce and came in contact with other workers who reported on other struggles of workers in Africa and beyond.

By the end of the period of South African destruction in the eighties, the Benguela Railroad had been halted and the dock workers plagued by low wages and poor working conditions. More than 60 per cent of the population now reside in urban areas. The growth of musseques in cities such as Luanda was a manifestation of the dispersal of the peasantry. Petty trading and the "candonga" market became signals of the hustling mentality which corrupted the social structure of the society. Corruption at all levels of the bureaucracy and armed forces undermined professionalism by patriotic elements. The stagnation of the skills, knowledge and development of this class compounded the devaluation of the return for labour. The fact was that the devaluation could not be separated from the ways in which productive resources were diverted for warfare.

This short sectoral analysis will point out the areas where the workers were to be found in the eighties.

- The most stable section of the working class was located in the petroleum industry, transportation, the remnants of the plantation and agricultural sector, the small industrial sector of textiles, food processing, chemicals, electrical goods, vehicle assembly and small-scale enterprises.
- The large numbers of workers in the bureaucracy and conscripted soldiers in the armies of FALA and FAPLA.
- Workers in the service sector of the economy, servants, security guards, and other workers servicing the foreign peace-keeping and NGO sector.
- One of the striking aspects of Angola is the large numbers of workers who work in the so called informal sector as itinerant traders. The money changers at every street corner in Luanda are the most visible signs of this strata. Rocque Sentiero in Sambizanga is one of the largest markets in Africa, where a million persons pass through every day. This major commercial and cultural centre is a microcosm of the vibrancy of this sector of the society.

Yet, it is in this area of the economy where one is exposed to the full implications of the disorganization of the workers unleashed by economic reforms. The problems of health, safety and security for members of the working class in this sector compounded the general insecurity of war-time conditions. This development also eroded the political base of the MPLA in so far as this party had its strength among the organized working poor. The disorganization of the working people in the informal sector is part of a larger war against the poor on the African continent.

The liberalization of the economy had a negative effect on the working class. War time shortages of basic commodities ensured that most commodities were in short supply and could be found only on the parallel market. With the dawn of the nineties, the parallel market became the principal arena for the interface between international capital and the "informal sector" with the US dollar becoming the principal medium of exchange. The economic war against the poor compounded the weakness of the people of Angola, especially women. The limited gains which were made by Angolan women in relation to the family code, minimum wages and health care disappeared.

THE MIDDLE STRATA AND THEIR AMBIVALENCE AS AN IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE WAR

The poverty of Portugal meant that up to 1975 poor white workers had competed with skilled African workers in the productive areas of the economy. There were white taxi drivers, bricklayers, construction workers and members of the lower ranks of the colonial bureaucracy. The limited educational opportunities meant that the middle class (European, mestizo and African) was weak compared to their counterparts in other colonies. Tensions between the assimilados, the children of chiefs and the mestizo simmered under the weight of Portuguese colonialism. The role of the missionaries was crucial in providing limited education to some Africans, especially the sons of chiefs. These children internalised the ideas of White supremacy and competed with the mestizo section of the assimilado population. Both the African and the mestizo were discriminated against by the structures of White supremacy. The mestizo accepted the myth of White superiority and Black inferiority. This section was ambivalent to Africa but exposure to Soviet Marxism had provided an avenue for an alliance with the working class in the MPLA.

In the analysis of Wamba, UNITA was rooted among the children of rich peasants who were aspiring to become capitalist farmers. The callousness of the leaders of UNITA and the destruction unleashed against the peasantry demonstrated that this class had no sense of a national consciousness. At independence in 1975, the mestizo and middle-strata elements of the MPLA had to take control of the government bureaucracy once the settlers were evacuated to Portugal and South Africa. The peasants could not read or write and the working class did not have the skills necessary to inherit and to run the colonial apparatus. Overnight, young militants were given tremendous responsibilities. The educated elements who had joined the MPLA found that their creativity was stifled by the sterile Marxism of the state. It was a version of history which uncritically accepted the European modes of transition as those of Africa and a version of materialism which viewed the spiritual values of the African as metaphysics. At the

end of the period of state control over the economy, this heritage of historical materialism had given way to the ideas of neo-liberalism. With the values of private accumulation and property gaining ground, corruption became such an established aspect of accumulation and class formation that there were deep divisions in this class and these divisions were manifest in the fissures in the MPLA. The advent of the parallel market gave an edge to the senior cadres who could turn state property into private property. The explicit programme of the IMF in the privatisation was for this strata which had accumulated in the state to become the local capitalist class.

Corruption, war profiteers and with a small commercial strata operating as middle persons between foreign companies, laid the foundations for the creation of a small capitalist class of Angolans. This class was embryonic and the economic reforms could not accelerate its growth fast enough. African women who dominated the "informal sector" were the most active entrepreneurs in the society but the whole administrative machinery for economic operations was not organized to support their activities. They did not have the collateral to get loans from the banking institutions nor did they have the organizational support for insurance, licensing and the other principles necessary to set up full-fledged capitalist enterprises. Former bureaucrats and rehabilitated settler elements with commercial expertise along with contacts in the import-export sector were the most obvious beneficiaries of the liberalization process. The racial configuration of capitalist relations with Brazil, Portugal and South Africa ensured the ascendancy of a small section of the population. Because of the volume of this import-export trade there were some areas of cooperation with local Angolans who were to be found in the interstices of the economy.

The fact that the mestizo, White and assimilado elements from the state bureaucracy were the most obvious beneficiaries of the primitive accumulation meant that UNITA could mobilise the opinion of African peasants against this strata. The manipulation of the symbols of African fundamentalism was most obscene since the leadership of this party was in no way less compromised by virtue of their linkages with Portuguese and South African capital through offshore banking, diamond dealing, arms purchases and the transportation of weapons. However, the poor in the urban areas were unaware of the extent of these linkages. It was the clear opulence of those in the government which alienated large sections of the poor from the political leadership. Satellite television antennas, electric generators and individual water pumps, education, holiday and hospital care in South Africa and Portugal meant that this strata in both the military parties were not as affected as other sections of the population by the war.

One section of this strata which forms part of the class structure of Angolan society is the hundreds of international "humanitarian" workers in Angola. These workers form a link between international interests and the people, and mediate the external involvement in the economy. The project activities of the UN Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeal for Angola give a breakdown of these expatriate workers who do jobs which would otherwise be done by Angolans. These workers are in the main employed by international non governmental agencies and "donor" organizations and with their opulent standards of living stand out in the midst of the war and destruction in Angola.

INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL AND THE ECONOMY OF ANGOLA.

Angola has always been a rich prize in Africa. The wealth of the country is now legendary and after 1975 the petroleum resources produced the anomaly of a "socialist" country dominated by the giants of the international oil industry. The names of Chevron, Elf, Petrofina, BP, Texaco Petrobas dominated the extraction of petroleum. A similar array of forces with names such as DeBeers were involved in the Angolan economy with respect to the extraction of diamonds. External domination of the economy has been a key factor in the politics of the society. The war in Angola has been fuelled by the struggles to control the vast wealth of this society. In this regard peace should be measured not so much against the damage or defeat inflicted upon one side, but against the extent to which the political goal of empowering the Angolan people is realized.

A quotation of Franz Mehring is here relevant,

War is an explosion of historical contradictions which have sharpened to the point where no other means are available for their solution since there are no judges in a class society who can decide by juridical or moral means those conflicts which will be solved by weapons in war. War is therefore a political phenomenon, and not juridical, moral or even a penal one. War is not conducted in order to punish an enemy for supposed or real sins, but in order to break his resistance to the pursuit of one's own interest. War is not a thing in itself possessing its own goal, it is an organic part of a policy to whose presuppositions it remains attached and to whose needs it has to adapt its own successes."³¹

This conception of war is also amplified by the question of the ideas which are at the forefront of a war. In Angola, for over 400 years, the principal idea of the African people was to free themselves from foreign domination. However, as Cabral maintained, the national liberation project in Africa was not revolutionary or socialist. Cabral had queried: is the national liberation movement something which has simply emerged from within our country, is it a result of the internal conditions created by the presence of colonialism, or are there external factors which have determined it?³² Cabral answered his own question by pointing to the internal and external contradictions in the movement for national liberation. The external factors were to become more significant in the context of Angola after the invasion of South Africa in 1975.

The South African invasion by an army committed to apartheid and colonial rule in Namibia changed the whole character of the internal contradictions and the contradictions between Angolans and international capital. The war was compounded by not only the issues of the Cold War, but also by the issues of the decolonization of Namibia and the end of White supremacy and apartheid in Southern Africa. That the Cold War was not the central problem was manifest in the intense efforts to destroy SWAPO as a national liberation movement and to occupy Southern Angola to prevent the consolidation of the struggle for self-determination by SWAPO. In this period, it could be said that the MPLA and the Cubans were fighting a just war. The alliance of UNITA with the South Africans removed the claims of UNITA that they were a force fighting for the dignity of Africans. It was impossible to fight for the dignity of Africans while supporting a government which dehumanised Africans in the segregated conditions of apartheid.

The integration of UNITA has been documented by both of the books concerning the US intervention in Angola, that of Daniel Spikes and John Stockwell. The details need not detain us despite the justification for this integration as presented by the published sources sympathetic to UNITA. What is of interest is how this alliance created a momentum of war for South African capital and for Armscor even after the attainment of majority rule by Africans in South Africa. The alliance between UNITA and South African capital and later the MPLA and Executive Outcomes of SA was a manifestation of a more profound alliance between elements of the African middle strata and international capital. This alliance was disguised in the case of the MPLA in state enterprises, but open with the reliance of UNITA on South Africa and Zaire.

The social character of the war determined by the social forces explains the present stalemate between the forces of MPLA and UNITA and the inability of either side to deliver a decisive end to the conflict. The class which is in power has become less clear in its project and this lack of clarity affects the alliances and partners in the war.

To substantiate this statement it is necessary to develop a periodization of the war since 1961.

- 1961-1974: the war of national liberation with the MPLA emerging as the principal force for self-rule.
- 1975-1976: consolidation of the alliance of the MPLA with the people under the weight of the South African and Zairian invasion.
- 1981-1988: the threat against the whole society by the South African invasion. The alliance with Cuba to defeat the South African threat.
- The war after 1992 and the reliance of the MPLA on external sources of support to repulse the take-over of the majority of the country by UNITA.

The relevant issue for this paper is where did UNITA obtain the requisite military capital to take over 70% of the country after the 1992 elections? In order to answer this question it is necessary to examine the stakes in Angola and the resources of Angola.

THE STAKES AND THE RESOURCES IN ANGOLA

Angola which lies north of Namibia, is a large territory on the Atlantic Ocean, with borders with Zaire and Zambia. Numerous elements have coveted the wealth of this society. The long quote from the Economist Intelligence Unit reproduced below gives an idea of this wealth.

In theory, Angola should be one of Africa's richest countries. Few parts of the continent have such a favourable resource endowment. Covering 1.25 million Kms (over five times the size of the UK), Angola has an abundance of land, only 4 per cent of which is currently estimated to be under cultivation. Climatic conditions are generally favourable for agriculture and a very wide range of crops can be grown. Besides feeding its own population, Angola could be a large net exporter of agricultural produce, and until the troubles of the last decade, it was the world's fourth largest producer of coffee. It also has large livestock resources in the more arid south, extensive forest areas and, off its southern coast, some of the best fishing waters in Africa.

Angola is best known as an energy rich country. It has large deposits of oil and gas, and oil has been the main export since 1973. In addition, there is vast hydroelectric potential on the country's rivers, which one day could also provide the water for extensive irrigation. Furthermore the subsoil is a treasure ground of minerals, and Angola could eventually revert to its traditional role as one of the world's most valuable sources of diamonds. Before independence in 1975, there was a fast growing light manufacturing sector (roughly on par with Kenya) and there had been considerable investments in railways, roads and other infrastructure.³³

The various publications which point to the potential for recovery are important documents which can shed light on the vast wealth of the country. The significant point which has to be reinforced is that transnational capital has always dominated the economy of Angola, even during the period when the MPLA proclaimed itself a Marxist Leninist Party. One of the striking features of this period of warfare was that foreign capital intensified the extraction of minerals while there was untold destruction of human life in the society.

The permanence of the war since 1975 is connected to both the interests of transnational capital and the political activities of one of the parties, UNITA. This party has been able to continue the war after 1992 because of its control over the vast diamond fields in Lunda North Province.

DIAMONDS IN THE ANGOLAN WAR.

"It is widely acknowledged that the kimberlite pipes are believed to be among the world's five richest deposits of embedded diamonds, and it has been forecasted that revenue from diamond sales, assuming a cessation of guerrilla war could increase nine fold."³⁴ This quotation from a prominent European publication summed up the perspective of international investors on the diamond resources of Angola. In 1986, ENDIAMA, the state run diamond company signed an agreement with Roan Selection Trust International to operate at Kanfunfo in Cuango Province. Output was 2.4 m carats in 1974, falling to 300,000 carats in 1976, following independence. Production rose to about 600,000 carats in 1979, and 1.5m in 1980, but declined to an estimated 900,000 carats in 1985, owing to guerrilla attacks and smuggling. In 1986, when the industry was reorganized, output declined further, to only 200,000 carats (less than 0.3% of total world output of uncut diamonds). Output is estimated to have recovered sharply to nearly 1m carats in 1988 and to 1.3m carats in 1989, although falling to 1.1 m carats in 1990 and to 960,000 carats in 1991. In 1992 output was estimated to have risen to 2.7 m carats. The increase was accounted for by the entry of thousands of small prospectors in the region.

On the front page of the New York Times, on September 3 1992, was the picture of the prospecting fields of Lunda North in Angola. Under the same picture, which had been carried a week earlier in a British newspaper, the caption read:

From the air they look like anthills, tiny pits studding the landscape, evidence of primitive mining operations which are shaking the foundations of the world's most successful De Beers diamond empire.

Below this picture the story started with the alarm that:

An estimated 50,000 diggers are taking part in the diamond rush in northern Angola. Sold and bartered locally for a pittance, their gems are flooding into the world diamond-cutting centre of Antwerp at a valuation of some \$500 million a year forcing DeBeers to buy them up in an anxious effort to protect the market. The strain on the corporation's finances recently sent shares crashing on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange.

These newspaper articles in London and New York expressed the anxiety of international capital over what would happen once Angolans had gone from fighting each other to mining the minerals under their soil and rivers. The issue of the Angolan peasants versus the monopoly of DeBeers was one of the unspoken issues of the Angolan war. The alarm which was raised in Johannesburg, Geneva, Tel Aviv, London and New York was masked in other phrases when it came to how the West wanted a resolution of the military struggles in a way which would strengthen the control of DeBeers of the mining operations in both Angola and Zaire. The war prevented the stabilization of the diamond marketing.

The alarm raised in the New York Times also pointed to the potentialities of the Angolan economy if the people of Angola were to gain control of that economy. It is precisely for this reason that the stakes are so high in the Angolan war. The United States had long known of the rich potential of Southern Africa. Geologists know that because of the age of the African continent, the area from southern Zaire down to South Africa is one of the richest in minerals in the world. The satellite maps taken of the geological make-up of the region by the USA had shown that one of the richest veins of kimberlite lay at the border between Zaire and Angola.

The intense fight for Canfunfo (1992-1994) represented a mirror of the struggle to determine which section of the future Angolan ruling class would control the sales of diamonds. This intense struggle was one of the real stumbling blocks to the peaceful implementation of the Lusaka Accords. It has been interpreted that the technical issues of demobilization and the quartering of FALA were the real stumbling blocks, but the question of control of the diamond fields is one of the unresolved issues of the unwritten clauses of national reconciliation.

Under the MPLA government, the state-run organization, Endiama, had the sole right to sell diamonds internationally. By the end of 1991, there were many diamonds in local hands that in order to put some "rationality" into this enterprise, the state passed a law which gave individuals the right to own and sell diamonds. The law said that it was legal for Angolans to possess uncut diamonds and sell it to the state-run monopoly, Endiama. The only constraint was that individuals could not export diamonds.

When the Bicesse Accords were signed in 1991, many unemployed Angolans and demobilized soldiers went to Lunda North to take part in the mining operations. Agricultural production was made risky by the land mines. Many coffee farmers who had fled to Zaire returned to seek wealth in digging for diamonds. In a short period, there were over 50,000 prospectors involved in the frontier spirit of the region. The diamond cartel of DeBeers is opposed to the operation of market forces in Angola, if the Angolans are to be effective actors in the market. In order to be on the safe side during the 1992 election campaign, the company provided a house for Jonas Savimbi in Luanda.

The language of restructuring the diamond industry and attracting foreign investors is found in the major publications dealing with the reconstruction of Angola after the peace. This is the language which will be used to justify the physical removal of the thousands of Africans who are attempting to earn their livelihood as prospectors in their own country. Part of the dialectic of this process is that this very same enterprise is helping to shape the process of class formation in Angola. Those who enriched themselves illegally and now feel confident will align themselves with international capital and call for the rationalization of the industry. Others, with guns are trying to compete through sheer force. The frontier spirit of Lucapa hides the deep divisions between the government and UNITA. The airstrip and the town remained in the hands of the government while the territory outside the town was held by UNITA. Diamonds, guns, unemployment and hundreds of ex-soldiers provide the ingredients for warlordism.

The potentialities of cooperation between democratic governments in Southern Africa are tremendous because the countries of the region produce over 60 per cent of the diamonds for the world market. Real economic integration and cooperation between South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Angola, Tanzania and Zaire could have a decisive impact on the international marketing of diamonds. This is one of the major issues of war and destabilization in Southern Africa. The issue of diamonds can partially explain the vigilance of certain elements of the past South African regime with respect to the fortunes of peace and war. The question of the future content of democracy in Zaire is also linked to the issue of the sale of diamonds.

THE WAR AND THE PETROLEUM RESOURCES

The petroleum industry is the sole economic mainstay of the government, with petroleum extraction, refining and distribution constituting Angola's most important economic activity. Hydrocarbons generally accounted for more than 90% of total exports during the 1980s. The petroleum sector provided for more than 50% of state revenues and about 30% of GDP. Total proven reserves of crude petroleum were estimated at 1,818 m barrels in 1991.

Though Angola is a major exporter of petroleum products, the wars in the country prevented it from becoming a member of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC).

The whole apparatus for export and marketing of petroleum products exposes the alliance between the local political leadership and transnational capital. The petroleum sector is dominated by Chevron (formerly Gulf Oil) of the USA, which accounts for over two-thirds of the total output. The other concessions are held by Agip, Elf Aquitaine, Conoco, and Texaco. The state-owned oil company is also participating as a minor actor in partnership with Petrobras of Brazil.

The reality that the oil industry was not really affected by the war was noted by a major publication which pointed to the new concessions granted to Occidental of the USA, British Petroleum and Petrofina. After citing the figures of increased production since 1992, this publication noted that, "The oil industry appeared relatively unaffected by the resumption of hostilities in late 1992, despite the capture of the northern town of Soyo (responsible for about one third of Angola's output) by UNITA for two months in early 1993."³⁵

The fact that the major portion of this oil is exported as crude to the United States makes the US one of the parties most interested in the actual strength of the forces at war and the issues of peace. During the period of the South African invasion, there was the situation of Cuban troops guarding the oil installations from attacks of elements financed by the United States government. Similarly, in 1993, one of the sternest warnings to UNITA came from President Clinton warning of grave consequences if UNITA attacked the oil installations in Cabinda.

The Angolan province of Cabinda is a microcosm of the stakes in the war. In the words of Wamba Dia Wamba, "it became a field of imperialist maneuvers." Wamba had pointed to the multiple interests of the USA, France (in particular the interests of Elf-Congo), Zaire, Gabon and the Angolan peoples in this province. The splits and shifting alliances of the movements and the government in this province are tied to the intense external involvement in this rich province where the people are very poor. One legitimate grievance of the people of Cabinda is the fact that this area is one of the most underdeveloped in the country, yet it is the province which provides most of Angola's wealth. The tensions from this anomaly are aggravated by the intense interests of member states of the European Union which have an interest in dominating the rich resources of Congo, Cabinda, Zaire and Angola.

All the authorities on the Angolan economy point to the fact that the government bartered the revenues from oil for the next seven years in order to fight the war against UNITA. The point which is here important is how the wealth of diamonds and oil were recycled to the arms manufacturers of the advanced capitalist countries. It is the nature of the weapons systems which shaped the strategies of the combatants in the war. The small manufacturing and trading sector of the economy was financed by the export of oil and diamonds.

The industrial activity of Angola is based on construction materials, petroleum refining, food processing, textiles, equipment for the petroleum industry, electrical goods and vehicle assembly. The ravages of war have meant that this sector of the economy has stagnated with production seriously affected by the shortages of raw materials and the poor working conditions. The wretched conditions of the labour process inhibited the kind of contribution from the working people which would have harnessed the resources of the society to resist foreign military intervention. The stagnation of the industrial and agricultural sectors reflected the weakness of internal accumulation. The dispersal of the peasantry has created a large dependence on food imports. More than two-thirds of the country's food requirements are now imported and the distribution of food during the war exposed how food was a weapon of war in Africa.

THE STRATEGIES OF WAR IN ANGOLA.

The art of strategy is to determine the aim which is, or should be, inherently political; to derive from that aim a series of military objectives to be achieved, to assess these objectives as to the military requirements they create, and the pre-conditions which the achievements of each is likely to necessitate; to measure available and potential resources against the requirements; and to chart from the process a coherent pattern of priorities and a rational course of action.

This quotation with respect to the Second World War is useful to understanding how military means are used to advance a given political goal.

In the experience of Angola the clearest political goal was peace and self-determination. Yet, as Cabral warned, there were many interests involved in supporting national liberation. Cabral had pointed out that though the leaders of the national liberation struggles pick up arms, they were armed militants and not militarists. From the point of view of the working poor, the objective of liberation was to rid themselves of foreign domination. This political goal as the core of the military strategy of the people and government of Angola was clear up to 1992. The military journals of the FAPLA boasted of the growth of the army from a guerrilla organization to a standing army. By tracing its origins in the guerrilla war, the MPLA was at that time reasserting its strategy of depending on the people of Angola for support. In the words of the official history of FAPLA,

After the various truces of July 1974 and the agreement of 21 October officializing these truces between the MPLA and the Portuguese Armed Forces, the Struggle changes in form. So the guerrilla forces became a regular army whose aim is the defence of independence, territorial integrity and the sovereignty of the new state.³⁶

The transformation of this insurgent army into a conventional force was a process which was itself fuelled by the need to fight a defensive war. Slowly, during the eighties under the threat and reality of South African occupation, the forces of FAPLA began to acquire the kind of weapons which could repulse the South African invasion. The acquisition of tanks, combat vehicles, rocket launchers, jets, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and sophisticated anti-aircraft radars created the conditions for a new hierarchy in the military. This hierarchy was the mirror of the deepening class cleavages in the MPLA. This army did not inherit the Portuguese military traditions. Unlike Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa where former guerrillas were integrated into the former colonial military structures, FAPLA developed as an army whose strategy was based on defending the gains of political independence. This political strategy which guided the military operations was accentuated by the clarity of the goal of supporting the independence of Namibia. Despite the sophisticated weaponry and the large expenditure on weapons, FAPLA until 1992 was a coherent army. The heavy expenditure on sophisticated weapons meant that over the period 1981 to 1988 the soldiers in FAPLA were limited in their flexibility and response to the South African conventional occupation and the flexible war (conventional and guerrilla) of UNITA. The alliance with Cuba mitigated the corrosive effects of heavy expenditure on weapons.

This alliance did not affect the military strategy which had been spelt out in the FAPLA Proclamation. The Cubans had long-standing relations with the principal liberation movements of Africa. The Cuban army, like the Angolan's, had been transformed from being a guerrilla army to a conventional force capable of defending territorial sovereignty. The economic and cultural blockade of Cuba by the US had given a clear anti-imperialist character to the ideology of the Cuban armed forces. It was this clarity of purpose which led to the sterling resistance to the forays of the South Africans in Operation Askari and the crushing humiliation of the South African armed forces at Cuito Cuanavale.³⁷

In fact, one of the weakness of the South African campaign in Angola was the lack of clarity of the political objectives. At Cuito Cuanavale the South Africans had been deceived by their own propaganda as their operational objectives were unclear. On the one hand the psychological warfare section of the military had said that South Africa had intervened in Angola to defend UNITA and to fight communism, but the massive

preparations which went into the war demonstrated a different political objective, that of setting up a provisional government and capturing the logistics and command centre of the Angolans at Menongue.

This lack of clarity on the part of the South Africans flowed directly from the contradictions of the politics of apartheid and colonialism. The military strategies which flowed from the desire to maintain White domination in Southern Africa contradicted the political objectives of international capital which wanted to groom a class of African entrepreneurs with a stake in the future of capitalism in Africa. In this sense, the contradictions between the political and military strategies of the West were compounded by the fact that Africans decided to fight for independence in Namibia and continued the fight against White rule in South Africa.

It is worth recalling the decisive battles in the war for Angola since 1975. These battles were at Quifangondo in 1975, when the Angolans and Cubans repelled the South Africans, Zairians and mercenaries from the USA, the battle at Cuito Cuanavale, the battle for Luena in 1991, the battles for Kuito and Huambo in 1994. Africans were defending their right to independence and in all wars, defensive war is a higher form of warfare if both sides have the same weapons. The involvement of the Cubans in 1987-1988 exposed the fact that there was nothing superior about Whites in the handling of weapons. Cuito Cuanavale was the turning point in the history of Southern Africa.

The issue of the political and military strategy for a society is here important in the search for peace. In the war after 1992, the forces of MPLA had been demobilised. The soldiers who were the veterans of Cuito Cuanavale had been re-integrated into civilian life. In one sense, there are those who argue that the Bicesse Accords were meant to dismantle the military infrastructure of FAPLA which defeated the South Africans. When UNITA seized more than 60 per cent of the country, the government was on the defensive. Instead of developing a political strategy to guide the military response to the aggression of UNITA, the government signed a contract worth more than US\$20 million with a private South African company. The shift in the political outlook and the military strategy of the government can be seen from its alliance with the former soldiers of the SADF who were organized in a private force called Executive Outcomes.

In the words of one publication,

A South African 'security consultant' firm, Executive Outcomes (EO), has apparently provided armed personnel to assist both UNITA and government forces. In late 1992 and in early 1993, EO was providing assistance to UNITA on contract. Then, in February 1993, the government hired 100 expatriate armed personnel through EO to protect privately-owned oil installations in Soyo. Thus in the first quarter of 1993, EO employees found themselves assisting operations against each other.³⁸

The reliance of the MPLA government on Executive Outcomes was a manifestation of the changed political and ideological conditions among the leaders of this party. Executive Outcomes is part of the political strategy of international capital to have a privatised army in the region after the coming to power of majority rule in South Africa. In the dying days of the apartheid regime, the former Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, proclaimed the success of the privatization exercise in South Africa. The military, in collaboration with elements of manufacturing and mining capital, have established a key-points strategy. Under this strategy private security firms were established where select elements of the all white army have been kept intact. While there has been the public report of the demobilization of some of the more notorious

forces such as the 32nd battalion and the other elements of Koevet who repaired to South Africa (from independent Namibia), there are elements of the military who have been deployed in other areas such as the National Parks. Others later regrouped under the name of Executive Outcomes. The General Manager of this "private army," Eben Barlow, had formerly been a Lt. Col in the 32nd Battalion, the unit which had been used by the South African army in its war of destabilization.

The soldiers recruited for this force were outcasts of the SADF who would not have been integrated into the armed forces after the coming to power of the government of national unity led by Nelson Mandela. South African law barred former South African military personnel from operating in other countries, but EO gained a lucrative contract in Angola and later Sierra Leone. This development provided a logical continuity with the imperatives of militarization which had developed during apartheid. Though the government of South Africa as a member of the OAU was supposed to be working for peace, its nationals were fighting in Angola and the state corporation was selling weapons to UNITA.

The other component of the military strategy of international capital in Southern Africa is the support by external forces for the very large military base which is being built in Botswana. It was not insignificant that Executive Outcomes was fighting on the side of UNITA and later threw their complete support behind the government of Angola after the government of the United States recognized the MPLA in 1993. By this time the soldiers who had experience from the battles of 1975 to 1988 had been demobilized.

The strategy of war of the MPLA after 1992 was the logic of the dependence on conscription and big military budgets. Instead of trying to learn from the local experience of those soldiers with both the experience of guerrilla and conventional war (the veterans of Cuito Cuanavale), the Angolan government invested its energies in changing the clause of the Bicesse Accords which had prohibited both UNITA and the MPLA from acquiring new supplies of weapons. Between 1992 and 1994 the strategy of the MPLA was based on the acquisition of over US\$3.5 billion worth of weapons. One commentator who carried out research on the weapons procurement by the Angolan government concluded that, "The government has unquestionably been the largest arms purchaser in Sub-Saharan Africa during the past two years."³⁹

In this binge of mortgaging the resources of the society for instruments of death instead of providing for social services, the soldier was seen as the instrument of the weapon system. This conception affected the confidence of the ruling party in the ability of its soldiers to fight UNITA. At the diplomatic level this strategy led to the MPLA government hiring the same public relations firm in the USA which had been deployed by conservative Republicans to sanitise the image of UNITA. The military alliance between the MPLA and Executive Outcomes was a mirror of the new class alliances within the Angolan society. Up to 1992, it could be said that the MPLA was fighting a just war. The fact that war was not a moral question was exposed after the elections in 1992 when it was clear that Jonas Savimbi and UNITA rejected the results of internationally supervised elections. That UNITA could resort to war and receive support was an indication of the international alliance which was put in place to have UNITA control the government.

The decisive intervention of the Angolan people in the electoral process had led to the political defeat of UNITA in the parliamentary and Presidential elections. The MPLA was surprised by the outcome of the elections. The reform programmes which had been

implemented since 1991 had eroded the political base of the former liberation movement, but the poor understood that the militarism of UNITA was worse than the bureaucratic commandism of the MPLA. The people waited hours to vote and the symbolism of this process was captured by the woman who gave birth to her child while waiting to vote. She named the child "Vote."

Despite the confidence expressed by the population as reflected in the election results, MPLA had lost its coherence and discipline so that it could not politically mobilise the people to fight UNITA. This lack of discipline could be seen in November 1992 and January 1993 when innocent civilians were killed because they were suspected of being Zairians. This massacre of innocent civilians on ethnic grounds could be compared to 1975 when Zairian troops had been involved in an invasion of the country. This invasion did not prompt any such reprisal because at that historical moment, the MPLA was a disciplined party with a clear political strategy of building national sovereignty beyond the politics of ethnicity. By the period of the economic reforms, the top leadership of the MPLA was interested in building a capitalist class and this broke the discipline and coherence with its former political base in the musseques. Though the government issued a report condemning the "spontaneous killing" of the Bakongo, the corruption of ethnic identification had become a factor of the war, repeating the wave of killings which had taken place earlier in the capital, Luanda. UNITA sought to take advantage of this indiscipline and termed the killing "ethnic cleansing." This episode was a clear indication of the level of authority of the MPLA in the urban areas.

Because the stakes are so high, international capital is still unsure of the future politics of Angolan society under the leadership of the MPLA. The Lusaka Accords of 1994 provided the basis for an alliance between emerging class elements in UNITA and the MPLA. Since 1992 there has been no major disagreement between UNITA and the MPLA on the question of the future relationship between the extractors of the vast mineral resources and Angolan society. On the contrary, the various lobbying activities of both UNITA and the MPLA have been geared towards demonstrating that the foreign investments were safe under their leadership. Yet, the old hostility to the MPLA remain and this is manifest in the propaganda of UNITA which continues to call the MPLA a communist party. This declaration of Jonas Savimbi in his New Year message broadcast over Portuguese media was an effort to again woo the conservative forces that had emerged stronger in the politics of the USA after November 1994.

The insurgency in Cabinda is also held in reserve to destabilise the government, if the process of class formation is not to the advantage of the West. In order to speed up this process there are major fissures in the MPLA and this has led to the equivocation of the USA over the deployment of peace keepers to monitor the 1994 Accords.

THE STRATEGY OF UNITA

The political and military strategy of UNITA can be grasped from the shifting alliances that this party had made since its formation in 1966. Initially, this party was aligned with SWAPO and had sought to be considered as one of the leading forces for African liberation. There had been persistent reports of an alliance between UNITA and the colonial army during the independence period. William Minter in his study of Operation Timber: Pages from the Savimbi Dossier, produced some of the evidence of the

collaboration between Jonas Savimbi and the Portuguese. Though this account tended to personalise the political party of UNITA, this background helped to clarify the subsequent alliance with South Africa between 1975 and 1993. After the defeat of Portugal and the withdrawal of the settlers, UNITA joined the South Africans to fight SWAPO. The alliance with the apartheid regime formed the core of the politico-military strategy of this formation from 1975 to 1993. Studies by journalists and academics who journeyed to Jamba have pointed to the ways in which the organization of FALA was transformed from a guerrilla army to an army integrated into the command structure of the apartheid special forces.

The military organization of FALA also reflected the contradictions between the political propaganda of African fundamentalism and the reliance on the support of White supremacists. This alliance also influenced the weapon systems and the form of the military organization. W. James Martin in his study of A Political History of the Civil War in Angola 1974-1990 gives a clear picture of the military organization and how the external training in the USA and Morocco influenced the military strategies of this army. He outlined that,

By 1984, UNITA military forces were structured along guidelines used by most Western armies. FALA's high command consisted of Savimbi as Supreme Commander and a headquarters staffed by the Chief of Staff and Chiefs of Intelligence, Personnel, Operations and Logistics... By 1990, FALA boasted 20,000 regular troops, 18,000 semi regulars, 20,000 compact guerrillas and as many as 35,000 dispersed guerrillas. All in all, it is a highly motivated and professional force... The sum total of UNITA troop strength would place it at 71,000 troops. Other estimates of UNITA's military strength range from 28,000 to 90,000.⁴⁰

The military position of UNITA was enhanced by the support from the Departments of Defence in Washington and South Africa. During the period of the Cold War, UNITA was organized as a form of proto state, with all of the structures of banks, satellite communications systems, radio station, trading structures, links to international diamond cartels and an army to wage conventional warfare. This form of conventional warfare had been reinforced by the dependence of this army for training, logistics, command and control. FALA as the military wing of UNITA was far more organized than the political wing of the party. This was borne out by the militaristic posture of UNITA during the 1992 election campaign. UNITA as a political party did enjoy some political support, especially from those in the population who were exercised by the corruption and accumulation by the government. The extent of the support was manifest in the elections.

The influence of militarists in the ranks of UNITA meant that it did not fully demobilize its army in the period before the elections. Under the Bicesse Accords, the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA) was supposed to consist of an army of 50,000 soldiers, 20,000 from FAPLA and FALA with an air force of 6,000 and a navy of 4,000. By the date of the elections of September 1992, UNITA had only demobilized 11,106 of its 90,000 troops.⁴¹ The other soldiers had been held in reserve in Zaire to resume the war. In October, 11 generals of UNITA withdrew from the combined army and on October 31, full-scale war broke out again. Though there were those elements in UNITA who had wanted peace to take up their seats in the new parliament, the preparations which had been made by UNITA to win militarily at all cost led to the outbreak of the war when it was found out that UNITA lost the 1992 general elections. The heavy investment of the US military in the war in Angola was an important influence on the leadership of

UNITA. Between 1986 and 1992, the assistance to UNITA by the US military was over US\$250 million. Because so much of the literature on the war in Angola (in the English and French languages) is dominated by the West and those who support UNITA, it has been difficult to chart the real history of UNITA since its inception in 1966. Conservative Republicans in the USA never forgot the defeat in 1975 and these elements were at the forefront of supporting UNITA. The supply of Stinger missiles and other sophisticated weapons helped to change the political and military character of UNITA. This form of weaponry and the reliance on foreign sources led UNITA to take on an offensive strategy in the battles of Luena in 1991 and in all the major battles since 1993. It was this transformation into a conventional force which dictated the brutal occupation of the cities in the 1992 to 1994 war. The battle of Huambo in 1994 was decisive in the exposure of the degeneration of the militarists and the divisions in the party.

This degeneration had been clear in the city sieges and the ways in which UNITA carried the war against the civilians. A publication whose authors had been able to visit UNITA-controlled zones during the war pointed out that

"UNITA has been guilty of horrendous violations of war, including direct attacks on civilians, indiscriminate shelling, summary executions, mutilation of corpses, starvation of civilians, hostage taking, forced portering, recruitment of child soldiers, denial of the freedom of movement and blockage of relief aid."⁴²

A CAPITAL-INTENSIVE WAR

Armaments are destructive and are paid for out of surpluses from the society. Angola was spending over 50 per cent of its budget on weapons. Added to this were the resources being expended by UNITA. Military spending is therefore a drain on productive resources. Armaments never re-enter the production process as a means of production or consumption. In fact, warfare in the case of Angola represented a cancerous drain on the society as a whole. Because the entire cost of armaments was paid for by resources which could otherwise have gone to the reconstruction of the society, the purchase of armaments by both UNITA and the MPLA represented a deduction from the surpluses available in the society. The main beneficiaries of the arms procurement in this period were arms manufacturers outside of Africa. One publication, in citing the various suppliers of weapons to Angola, pointed out that in this period, Angola was Africa's number one arms buyer and that the government mortgaged the next seven years of oil production to finance the purchase of armaments.

In the period 1981 to 1988 the South Africans had developed the G-5 and G-6 155-mm long range artillery and had dubbed this weapon, the "best gun in any army in the world." The development of this weapon had emerged after the first defeat of the South Africans in Angola when their mercenary soldiers retreated in the face of the 122-mm rockets which were then in use by the MPLA. This weapon, a truck mounted multiple-rocket launcher, was old, dating back to the Second World War, and had assisted the Soviets in defeating fascism. Officially called BM-21 Katyushas, the weapon had been dubbed "Stalin Organs" and became even more famous in Africa after the 1975-1976 battles in Angola. Armscor had gone about developing the G-155 mm gun howitzer to confront the Stalin Organs. The G-5 towed field artillery piece and its derivative, the G-6, were the most publicised projects in the history of the South African arms industry. The details of how South Africa acquired the technology for this weapon exposed how Armscor was

integrated into the military industrial complex of Western Europe and North America⁴³ Though the capital intensity of the weapons in the Angolan war was not in the same league as the cruise missiles and other derivatives of the Star War tests against Iraq, the nature of the weapons was significant in a society where the technology of agricultural production was the hoe.

The military strategy of UNITA in war forced the pace of the acquisition of weapons by the government. After 1993, the war in Angola continued to be a capital-intensive war where the arms manufacturers of the West made super profits. Two of the books on warfare in Angola provide an inventory of the weapons systems employed by the armies and airforces in the war. In the South African account of Cuito Cuanavale War in Angola: The Final South African Phase by Helmoed-Romer Heitman, there is a complete inventory of the equipment of both sides. This inventory exposed the road from the AK 47 to the sophisticated weapons which were deployed in this historic battle. Similarly, the publication on Angola: Arms Trade and the Violations of the Laws of War outlines the procurement mechanisms of both the government and UNITA. Though this publication is in essence a cover for the resort to war by UNITA, it helps to underscore how UNITA was able to obtain weapons in spite of the sanctions imposed by the United Nations in 1993.

Mary Kaldor, in her analysis of the relationship between warfare and capitalism, underscored the role of war in the accumulation process of Western arms manufacturers. The conventional war in Angola registered as a destructive factor in the society, especially for the working poor and the soldiers conscripted by both sides.

Armaments are a means of destruction and they can never re-enter the production process as a means of consumption. In any society warfare is parasitical, dependent upon the productive possibilities of society as a whole. The most that warfare can do is to create the conditions for its own reproduction⁴⁴

There are two points which are worth noting from this quotation, (a) the fact that warfare is parasitical and (b) that warfare tries to create its own reproduction. The fact that warfare created the conditions for its own reproduction was most manifest by the involvement of Armscor in the war in Angola. Despite the fact that the Government of National Unity led by Nelson Mandela was committed to securing peace, the logic of the supply of weapons to UNITA by Armscor which had been going on for over ten years, meant that the stakes were so high that this company defied the government of Mandela and supplied weapons to UNITA despite the UN arms embargo. The UN arms embargo, though it was politically important in the diplomatic battles, it was ineffective in military terms. Members of the Security Council were supplying weapons to UNITA via Zaire. They included the French government even though it is a permanent member of the Security Council. One report exposed how the French government diverted arms meant for the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda to UNITA via Zaire after the downing of the plane of the President of Rwanda in April 1994.⁴⁵

The two points of Kaldor are central to the delays in the implementation of the Lusaka Accords and the fact that there are social forces inside and outside Angola with a vested interest in the continuation of war.

THE QUESTION OF PEACE IN ANGOLA

The war in Angola throws up the whole issue of the meaning of peace in Africa. The analysis so far has shown that there are social forces inside and outside Angola with a vested interest in warfare. There are also social forces in Angola and Southern Africa with a vested interest in peace. The problem has been that those who want peace are the poor, tired soldiers, women and the working people and they do not have control over the means of communication. The level of economic and cultural integration in Southern Africa has always been high. After the guns are silenced in Angola, the region of Southern Africa has the potential to be one of the most peaceful with the conditions for supporting the mechanisms of the OAU for conflict prevention, management and resolution.

Since 1991, the peoples of Angola placed tremendous trust in the peace-keeping capabilities of the United Nations. The United Nations had been established as a peace-keeping institution in the aftermath of World War II. The first purpose of the UN listed in its charter is:

to maintain international peace and security and to that end to take effective collective measures for the removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to the breach of the peace.

In the experience of peace-keeping in Africa, the record of the UN has been inglorious from the period of the Western invasion of the Congo and the murder of Patrice Lumumba to the failed effort in Somalia which ended in March 1995. The reality has been that in the case of Africa, the keeping of peace is subordinated to the wishes of the permanent members of the Security Council. The contradictions between the objectives of peace keeping and the dictates of the permanent members were exposed when the UN proved incapable to intervene to suppress the acts of aggression by the apartheid government in South Africa.

The first major involvement of the UN in peace-keeping in Angola was with respect to the removal of the Cuban troops from Angola. This mandate was consistent with the mission of the USA which saw the Cubans as a threat to Western influence in Africa. The smoothness of the operations of United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM) (1988-1991) had prompted the Angolans to rely on the UN to implement the Bicesse Accords. The expectations of the government of Angola were different from those of UNITA. For UNITA and its external supporters in the USA and South Africa, the withdrawal of the Cubans now opened the way for the Western military victory over the "Soviet" supported FAPLA army. On the other hand, the Angolan government expected to be treated as a sovereign country with the UN respecting the spirit and letter of the Accord. The record is now clear that the war never ceased in spite of the peace-keeping efforts of the UN. The major limitation was that this concept of peace was based on the silencing of weapons and not on the building of structures for peace.

The components of the peace agreement were:

- Ceasefire.
- Demobilization of the army.
- Creation of a new army before elections.
- Registration and elections.
- The swearing in of a new parliament based on multi-party democracy.

The ceasefire did take place however, there were numerous violations of the ceasefire but the UN Special Representative turned a blind eye to them. At that time, the Republicans were still in power in the USA and it was expected that UNITA would win the elections. This posture had been clear two years earlier after the first meeting between Jonas Savimbi and Dos Santos at Gbadolite in Zaire. At this meeting hosted by the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, there was an agreement drawn up before a dozen African heads of state for Savimbi to withdraw from the country before competing "on equal terms" for political office. Most Africans could not perceive Mobutu as a peace maker and neither Savimbi nor his supporters in the USA "were prepared for any outcome to peace except one which guaranteed bringing him to power. The US officials openly said that Savimbi must be at least Vice- President." This was the same position taken by diplomats and even the Secretary-General of the United Nations after UNITA lost the elections in 1992. There were no attempts to sanction Savimbi, there were always plans to reward his movement for destruction.

It is out of the scope of this paper to interrogate the failure and incompetence of the UN in the period of the 1992 elections. There has been a spate of articles on this saga by Victoria Brittain and both UNITA and the MPLA have their version of the reasons for the failure. This author has also presented an analysis of the UN and Angola.⁴⁶ The incapacity of the UN to implement the Peace Accords could be seen in three main areas, (a) the refusal of UNITA to allow the government to restore control over one-third of the territory, (b) the refusal of UNITA to surrender heavy arms to the UN, and (c) the failure to demobilise the bigger part of the army of UNITA. The important point which is relevant is that the ambivalence of the UN was based on the real interests of the conservative elements of the USA in Angola.

All of the major supporters of UNITA intensified their activities in the aftermath of the elections when it was clear that the results were unfavourable to UNITA. The Foreign Minister of South Africa, representing a government with no democratic traditions, flew to Angola to support peace talks. Sean Cleary, a consultant for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in South Africa, drew up a "concept paper" on power-sharing which would have placed the most important ministries in the hands of UNITA. Subsequently, reports from the South African press exposed the fact that at the very moment that Pik Botha and Sean Cleary were supposed to be arbitrating for peace, weapons were being loaded for UNITA via Zaire.⁴⁷ The activities of the South Africans and the representatives of the USA demonstrated how peace keeping was an important aspect of low- intensity warfare. In the doctrine of low-intensity warfare, peace keeping operations are

"military operations conducted in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve, restore or maintain peace in areas of potential or actual conflict. Typically, such operations are sponsored by the United Nations or some other supranational agency, and are conducted by multinational forces of which the US contingent is a part. Peace keeping represents a legitimate means for protecting US interests in the Third World."⁴⁸

The objectives of the US peace keeping operations were to further the interest of the allies of the US. The subordination of the UN to the interests of the USA was exposed in the peace discussions in Abidjan after the outbreak of the war. The Special Representative of the UN took a back seat while the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of the USA, Jeffery Davidow, worked out an accord which would have rewarded UNITA for going back to war.⁴⁹ Despite the intense pressures by a dying President of the Ivory Coast, Houphouet Boigny, and the capitulation of the MPLA, UNITA refused to accept the arrangements of Abidjan. The leadership of UNITA was confident that they would have won because they had held back the bulk of their army from the demobilization exercises in 1992. By May 1993, a new administration in Washington had recognised the MPLA government for the first time. There was however the anomaly of the White House seeking to support peace while the US military and intelligence institutions were supporting UNITA.

The resources from the petroleum industry assisted the MPLA to recover militarily. Both the diplomatic and military initiatives of the Angolan government were now bearing fruit. Western countries such as Britain lifted the ban on the selling of weapons to the MPLA. The recovery, coupled with the intense diplomatic activities of the government along with the governments of Southern African Development Community (SADC), led the UN to impose sanctions on UNITA in 1993. However, the military supply lines of UNITA demonstrated that UNITA had the financial, military, political and propaganda resources to withstand international sanctions.

The war of destruction in Angola has been spectacular to the extreme in the ways in which the firepower and mines have affected the poorest Angolans. It is usually said that in war the rich and the middle classes are not as affected as the poor. This has been very true in Angola. The figures on amputees is only a glimpse of the larger horror of the organized and sustained violence of coercion in that society. And yet, the spirit of the people was not broken. It is this spirit which is the main inspiration for the pursuit of peace in that society. This spirit was exhibited by the people of Kuito who opposed the capture of the city by UNITA even though FALA reduced the city to rubble. The siege of Kuito exposed the destructiveness of the capital intensive war and should have exposed the hollow claim that UNITA was supported by the Ovimbundu. Both Kuito and Huambo are supposed to be the heartland of the Ovimbundu people, the ethnic group for which UNITA was supposed to be fighting. The people of these towns suffered the worst instances of the violations of war by UNITA.

Three factors forced the Lusaka accords in 1994, the reinvigoration of FAA, the disintegration of UNITA and the changed political situation in the FLS. These changes were dialectically related and the present impasse stems from the fact that there are sections of the West who are still not certain that MPLA is sincere in its cry to support the operation of market forces. The limited memory of the government is now manifest in the confidence which is being invested in the Security Council of the UN as an agency for peace. This can be seen from the ways in which the protocols of Lusaka seek to repeat the same procedures for demobilization as those of 1992.

The elements of the protocol should be studied by intellectuals in the region who want to influence the peace process. The principal items relate to the completion of the Abidjan agreements in relation to the Bicesse Accords and the Security Council resolutions on Angola. There are five main issues in this protocol with deadlines and timetables for completion of tasks. These are: (I) military issues (a) re-establishment of the ceasefire, (b) withdrawal, quartering and demobilization of all UNITA military force, (c) disarming of all civilians, (d) completion of the formation of the Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), including demobilization. (II) the Police; (III) The United Nations Mandate, the role of observers of the peace accords and the Joint Commission; (IV) national reconciliation; (V) completion of the electoral process and other pending issues and (VI) Other matters.

The 64-page document of the Lusaka protocols was ratified by the United Nations in February. However, the implementation was held up because there was uncertainty as to whether the leader of UNITA supported the Accord. A Joint Commission, the body which comprised UNITA, MPLA and the observer countries of the USA, Portugal and Russia had the task of investigating the violations, but the latter continued. The nature and content of these violations intensified after the Congress of UNITA in Bailundo, February, 1995. The uncertainty with respect to the attitudes of the leader of UNITA intensified after the Congress of the party when it was clear that there were major divisions in the ranks of UNITA on the question of war. These divisions had intensified during the last part of 1994 when there were rumours of the injury and death of Jonas Savimbi. When Savimbi resurfaced after December 31, 1994 he called a Congress in an effort to reassert his control over the party which had splintered in three or four factions. At this meeting the main leaders of UNITA who had initialised the Lusaka Accord were dismissed. Eugenio Manuvakola, the Secretary-General of the party who had been in control of the last stages of the negotiations was sacked. Jorge Valentim who was the spokesperson to the party during the negotiations was also removed. Jonas Savimbi complained that his general opposed the Accord.

This position changed and only abated after the meetings between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Lusaka in May. After a much publicised visit to South Africa, Savimbi declared that he would recognise Dos Santos as President. However, the statements from the office of the President of South Africa declared that a position should be found for Savimbi in the government. This echoed the old position of the West that Savimbi should be made Vice President. The precedent of the alliance between Nkomo and Mugabe in Zimbabwe and the acceptance of a position in the government of South Africa by Buthelezi influenced this position.

Under the Lusaka Protocol it was agreed that UNITA would participate at all levels of the provincial, regional and national state apparatus. UNITA was guaranteed four ministries (Health, Hotel and Tourism, Commerce and Construction) six vice ministerial posts, three governorships (Lunda South, Uige and Cuando Cubango), vice governorship of Kwanza Sul, Benguela, Huila, and Bengo provinces, six ambassadorial posts, 30 municipalities (including Huambo town), 35 vice municipalities and 75 commune posts. UNITA would also be integrated into the police with 5,500 members distributed at the level of the officer corps and the rank and file.

The technical base of reconciliation exposed the effort of those who want to see a clear alliance between the rising accumulators in UNITA and those in the MPLA. One publication underlined the alliance between militarism and rampant corruption which

would be effected by bringing UNITA into the government without instituting mechanisms for accountability. The interests of the working poor are noticeably absent in this accord. Angolan women who were active in calling for peace were not involved in this pact. Neither were the church leaders who had not been compromised by supporting either side.

The agreement called for the deployment of over 7 000 peace-keepers from the UN who are to be drawn from Brazil, India, Pakistan, Rumania, Uruguay, and Zimbabwe. Each country will provide a battalion. Signals will be provided by Portugal with one logistics company from Britain. Romania will provide a military hospital and there will be a navy unit from Argentina. The meeting between Dos Santos and Savimbi in Lusaka cleared the way for the deployment of the peace-keepers.

PEACE AND HUMANITARIAN EFFORTS

The technical details of peace obscured the fact that there were other elements in Angolan society such as church leaders and ordinary citizens who wanted peace. With the emphasis on silencing weapons only, there was very little on the building of institutions to solve the contradictions among the people. The peace efforts did not include education for peace or the building of democratic structures which could sustain peace. Angolan society has had a long history of violence and coercion and there is the need for building institutions which could inspire popular intervention where differences in the society could be dealt with on a new basis. Treatment of differences, the development of politically neutral terminology and the process of demilitarization are elements which could sustain peace. The thrust of demystifying ethnicity must be an important aspect of the social reconciliation in the society. "The appeal to and the manipulation of an ethnic identity in Africa oftentimes obscures the material interests of those who employ it." In the words of Archie Mafeje,

There is a real difference between the man who, on behalf of his tribe, strives to maintain its traditional integrity and autonomy, and the man who invokes tribal ideology in order to maintain a power position, not in the tribal area, but in the modern capital city, and whose ultimate aim is to undermine and exploit supposed tribesmen.⁵⁰

The violence against the Bakongo in Luanda has raised the issue of ethnic insecurity in the society. Ethnic insecurity, competition and divisions developed not only out of war but also out of inadequate education and corrupt politics. The pursuit of ethnic security and the free association of all communities must be one of the foundations of peace.

The peace process requires the full participation of the Angolan peoples. This would include new institutions for popular participation of the working poor at the level of local government administration. This would rely on a policy of reconstruction based on education, participation and development from below to restore the confidence of the working people. However, the plans of the UN humanitarian appeal suggest an alternative path where international non governmental elements would begin to play a more dominant role in the Angolan society. This would ensure a repeat of the Mozambican experience of war, peace accords, international supervised elections and stagnation which reflects one path of the post colonial road. Joseph Hanlon who has studied the impact of foreign humanitarian organizations in Southern Africa has pointed

out the negative impact of this work when foreigners have been brought in at high cost (out of budgets allocated for aid) to carry out jobs that locals can do at one-quarter the cost.

There are thousands of consultants in Angola who now earn their living flying in and out to tell the "donors" what the local workers could have told them. What is particularly nefarious is the fact that many of these consultants are from the very same countries which supported destabilization. Using the experience of Mozambique, Hanlon said that

NGO's were brought in to distribute food and medicines when government agencies were already doing a better job at lower cost. But this was overtly political USAID was carrying out official policy to weaken the government and to reduce its size. Thus, in Zambezia province, one NGO was actually paid with aid money to compete with the government health service.⁵¹

In the peace-keeping experience of Mozambique, the process involved the expenditure of over US \$1 billion, all of which came from "donors". Most of this money went to the international staff and very little remained in Mozambique. At the end of the 1994 elections, the ambassador of the United States to Mozambique expressed satisfaction in the exercise and called on the international community to learn the lessons of peace-keeping operations. Can the lessons learnt by international elements in Mozambique be the same lessons for the producers in the region of Southern Africa? This becomes a burning issue in the context of the struggle for democracy beyond elite politics in Africa.

The experiences of Mozambique and Angola suggest that the very same forces who profited from warfare are the same elements who want to profit from the peace keeping process. This is clearest with respect to the companies seeking contracts for the removal of landmines and unexploded ordinance in Angola. There is the obscene situation of the very companies who sold the mines bidding for the contracts to remove the mines. Estimates are that it cost US \$3-6 to produce a landmine and it cost over US\$50-100 to remove a landmine. Since the Secretary of State of the United States presented a report to Congress on "Hidden Killers: The Global Landmine Crisis," there has been a spate of international conferences on the clearance of landmines. The US Demining Assistance Programme provided training equipment and funds to clear landmines but very little of this money went to those from the societies most affected. This initiative has given rise to a new crop of consultants. Angola has one of the highest proportion of landmines and the long-term impact on the peasantry will be tremendous. The humanitarian appeal of the United Nations does not envisage the involvement of Angolans in the mine-clearing exercises. Peace in Angola and Africa requires that Africans participate at the international level to ban the production and use of landmines.

The Angolan society can avoid the extreme forms of humanitarian domination since Angola is rich enough to take the lead in the reconstruction of the society. Of the total costs associated with the implementing of the Lusaka Protocol, the Angolan government will contribute about 30 per cent while the other 70 per cent will come from international contributions. The strengthening of the local capacity of Angolans to take the lead in reconstruction will depend on deeper cooperation with those societies in Southern Africa which have a vested interest in resisting recolonization. In Angola, this will require a determined struggle against those who see the future of Angola as tied to Brazil and Portugal instead of in a strong and integrated Southern Africa.

CONCLUSION

This paper began with the cultural outpouring of an artist who called on politicians to pull their own weight. In the introduction it was also pointed out how the organic intellectuals of the armaments industry have regrouped into conflict resolution centres. Some of these centres declare that they are also institutions of peace. However, the very nature of the functioning of the international system requires a deeper interrogation of what is the meaning of peace. The Angolan peace process since 1975 raises fundamental questions of the efficacy of technical undertakings relating to demobilization and the creation of new armies based on former combatants. None of the treaties orchestrated since the Alvor accords of 1975 seriously questioned the intellectual and economic underpinnings of militarism in Africa.

The peoples of Southern Africa have suffered from the oppression initiated by colonialism, the military pacification campaigns and the war to destabilize the project of self-determination in the region. This has been most evident in Angola where the war for national independence was taken over by the issues of the Cold War and the ensuing militarization of the state and society. Displaced by the massive firepower of a capital intensive war, mobilised on the basis of ethnic and regional consciousness and exploited at every level of the social structure, the poor of Angola developed techniques of survival while hoping for a period of peace where they could participate in the reconstruction of the society.

Since the political change in South Africa in May 1994, the question of peace and demilitarization has been placed squarely before the peoples of the region. Peace and demilitarization came in the context of deep changes in the material conditions of production both in Africa and in the international political system. The material transformations have been faster than the cultural and intellectual transformations. The political changes in the region emanated from the confidence of the poor that they could fight for self-determination. African women and the youth are in the forefront of the challenge to conceptualize the transformation of social relations. However, for the international mediators, peace is simply the silencing of weapons and not the building of democratic structures. The arms manufacturers at Armscor continue to seek to profit from wars in Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Angola and other parts of the world where there are explicit arms embargoes. The pressure to maintain this industry reinforces the point that peace in the region involves the conversion of the military industrial complex and the diversion of military budgets to the provision of social needs.

The elections in Mozambique in November 1994 and the engagement of the leaders of the Frontline states in the uprisings in Lesotho brought out the question of regional cooperation for peace in Southern Africa. There are elements who recognize that regional economic and political cooperation must be predicated on peace and social reconstruction. This reality propelled the leaders of SADC into the peace process in Angola. Throughout Southern Africa, the exploited seek new economic initiatives to break the marginalization of the peoples of Africa in the new world order.

Unfortunately, the question of peace has been conceptualised in terms of conciliating the very forces who have a vested interest in militarism and force. This is the major challenge in Angola. The war in Angola was one of the most protracted in Africa. The

stages of the war stretched from the period from the decolonization period to the end of the Cold War. Angolan society was the arena of intense contestation because the stakes were so high. The social forces in Angola who want peace have been marginalized and silenced by the military forces and the external mediators. Angolan women who have suffered the most from the war have been silenced by the tremendous effort to impose a form of market force which removes them from the real market place. These women through songs and orature console their communities, developing techniques of survival while planning for a period of peace where they could participate in the building of a different society. The essential but unrecognised base of the Angolan economy has been the unwaged work done in the household and in the community to provide health, education, and welfare. This work was done in the context of war daily renewing the energies of the society.

Feminists in Southern Africa have pointed to the need for different priorities in the peace and reconstruction process. Mcfadden argued that,

In Southern Africa, recent victories against settler colonialism have shown clearly that the contributions and sacrifices made by women (either through choice or misfortune) are quickly forgotten by their male 'comrades' after the initial euphoria of independence is over. These trends indicate that unless we challenge male power structures and begin to restructure the relationship between women on the one hand and men in their use and control of institutionalised violence (through the military, police and an array of weaponry) on the other, we will be faced with an even more dire situation in the future, in terms of our very existence as human beings.⁵²

The question of the future of Angolans as human beings and the struggles of men and women for a better life under conditions of peace help to bring back the issues of social emancipation away from the ideals of liberalization and structural adjustment. African scholars of every hue have pointed to the fact that there is now a definite effort to recolonize Africa using a new form of trusteeship system. Ali Mazrui argued for new forms of self-pacification by Africans since, "a more general collapse of law and order in some African countries is raising the spectre of recolonization and a new "trusteeship system." The elements of the new imperialism are real.⁵³

The ideology of liberalism is the handmaiden of this imperialism in the post Cold War period. The devaluation of the return to the working people is a major component of this strategy. In this sense there is a new form of warfare in Africa but the weapons are different. One of the weapons of this war is as old as colonialism, this is the weapon of divide and rule. This weapon will be harnessed in the period of structural adjustment. The embryonic elements of capitalism in Angola do not have the base for capital accumulation and in the process of competition ethnic rivalry will be manipulated.

The persistence of ethnic discussions and ethnic alliances serve the interests of those classes which are emerging out of the war strengthened in their role as middle persons for international capital. Coordination for peace in the society requires a new mode of politics which brings to the forefront the interests of the producers of Angola. This mode of politics must be based on democratic institutions not only in the central administration but in all areas of social reproduction. This is the major task since the society will have to struggle to overcome the deformities of 500 years of Portuguese colonial ideas. The challenge is for a new leadership to link itself to the consciousness of the people. In former periods of crisis, African women rose to this challenge and the history of Queen Nzinga remains part of the powerful memory of the poor who want reconstruction for the working people.

NOTES

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